Pregnancy and Moral Distinctions
(Co-authored with Elselijn Kingma.) We argue that careful attention to the nature of pregnancy shows that many traditionally important moral distinctions, such the doing/allowing distinction, action/omission distinction and the harming/benefiting distinction, do not apply easily to pregnant women and their fetuses. This has important practical implications in cases of ‘maternal-fetal conflict’.
Our first paper, "Can You Harm Your Foetus? Pregnancy, Physical Indistinctness and Difficult Deontological Distinctions" addresses pregnancy and the doing/allowing distinction. This paper has been conditionally accepted at Ethics. If you would like to read and comment on a draft paper, please email: f.woollard@soton.ac.uk)
This is part of a series of projects on Philosophy of Pregnancy and Early Motherhood at the University of Southampton, run by Elselijn Kingma and Fiona Woollard.
Our first paper, "Can You Harm Your Foetus? Pregnancy, Physical Indistinctness and Difficult Deontological Distinctions" addresses pregnancy and the doing/allowing distinction. This paper has been conditionally accepted at Ethics. If you would like to read and comment on a draft paper, please email: f.woollard@soton.ac.uk)
This is part of a series of projects on Philosophy of Pregnancy and Early Motherhood at the University of Southampton, run by Elselijn Kingma and Fiona Woollard.