Doing and Allowing Harm
My book, Doing and Allowing Harm, analyses and defends the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.
The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing states that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, arguing that this doctrine is necessary if anything is to genuinely belong to person - even that person's body. The monograph also explores the relationship between the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and general ethical theories and its implications for our duties to aid distant strangers in severe need.
My defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing is based on the notion of imposition. Imposition involves the needs or behaviour of one person intruding into the proper sphere of another. I argue that an agent who does harm imposes upon the victim but, barring special circumstances, an agent who allows harm does not impose upon the victim. Additionally, an agent who is forbidden from allowing harm is imposed upon by the victim, whereas, barring special circumstances, an agent who is forbidden from doing harm is not imposed upon. Thus a principle which forbids doing harm but permits allowing harm protects persons from harmful imposition. I argue that protection against imposition is necessary if anything is to belong to a person, even that person’s own body.
I've also written a bunch of papers in the area, for more details see Publications and Works in Progress.
The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing states that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, arguing that this doctrine is necessary if anything is to genuinely belong to person - even that person's body. The monograph also explores the relationship between the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and general ethical theories and its implications for our duties to aid distant strangers in severe need.
My defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing is based on the notion of imposition. Imposition involves the needs or behaviour of one person intruding into the proper sphere of another. I argue that an agent who does harm imposes upon the victim but, barring special circumstances, an agent who allows harm does not impose upon the victim. Additionally, an agent who is forbidden from allowing harm is imposed upon by the victim, whereas, barring special circumstances, an agent who is forbidden from doing harm is not imposed upon. Thus a principle which forbids doing harm but permits allowing harm protects persons from harmful imposition. I argue that protection against imposition is necessary if anything is to belong to a person, even that person’s own body.
I've also written a bunch of papers in the area, for more details see Publications and Works in Progress.